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COMMENTS
BALTIMORE’S MONUMENTAL QUESTION:
CAN THE HEIGHTENED SOCIAL CONSCIENCE
AGAINST THE CONFEDERACY REWRITE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS?
Blake Alderman
I. Introduction
Monuments are preserved in order to remember, educate the pub-
lic on, and acknowledge the monuments’ historical significance. Mary-
land’s monuments are designated by two authorities: the Board of the
Maryland Historical Trust and smaller municipal commissions.1 The
Board examines local monuments to be submitted to the national reg-
istry, whereas the smaller commissions are appointed and operate to
preserve local Baltimore monuments.2 On June 30, 2015, Baltimore
City Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake announced the creation of a
Special Commission to review all Baltimore City Confederate histori-
cal monuments.3
The Commission’s appointment stems from a recently heightened
national awareness of racism embedded in government culture. In the
past year, racial tensions have increased between African-American cit-
izens and the government through both physical violence and sym-
bolic messages. Following a United States Supreme Court ruling on
governmental issuance of license plates bearing the Confederate flag,
Maryland and other states faced the challenge of Confederate symbols
in their own communities.4 Maryland faces a unique challenge of bal-
ancing state-protected historical monuments, the citizens’ interest in
1. See generally MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8 (2016) (delegating authority to
afford historic preservation protection between the State and local author-
ity); see also MD. CODE. ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5A (2016).
2. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8-201 (2016).
3. Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, Mayor Rawlings-Blake Announces Review of Balti-
more’s Confederate Statues, CITY OF BALTIMORE (June 30, 2015), http://
mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2015-06-30-mayor-rawlings-
blake-announces-review-baltimore%E2%80%99s-confederate-statues.
4. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239
(2015).
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them, and whether the present societal culture demands the removal
of some, if not all of Baltimore City’s Confederate monuments.
This comment will address whether the mayor of Baltimore City
and a specially elected city commission may legally authorize the re-
moval of historically protected Confederate monuments when re-
moval constitutes deprivation of a property interest.5 The citizens
satisfy enacted state criteria in order to be beneficiaries of historical
and educational monument preservation, creating a legitimate claim
to the continued receipt of those acknowledged benefits.6 This com-
ment will also address whether Baltimore City and the Special Com-
mission’s actions have complied with procedural due process
protections afforded to citizens’ property interests.7
Following six months of investigation, the Commission recom-
mended in January 2016 that the Roger B. Taney Monument and the
Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson Monuments be re-
moved.8 The Commission must prepare an official report for Mayor
Rawlings-Blake, who will have the final say on the monuments’ fates.9
Although the report is slated for release in early spring, as of March
11, 2016, nothing has been published.10
II. Background
A. The Policy of Preservation in Baltimore City’s Commission for Historical
and Architectural Preservation
Baltimore has gained the moniker of “Monumental City” due to the
large number of historic monuments standing within Baltimore City
alone.11 In furtherance of the title, Maryland “was the first municipal-
ity in the United States to design a comprehensive program for the
preservation of its outdoor monuments.”12 The Maryland code recog-
nizes the historical preservation of monuments in two places: the land
use and real property article and the finance and procurement arti-
5. See infra Part IV and accompanying analysis.
6. See infra Part IV and accompanying analysis.
7. See infra Part IV.(D-E) and accompanying analysis.
8. Luke Broadwater, Baltimore City Commission Recommends Removal of Two Con-
federate Monuments, BALT. SUN (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.
com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-confederate-monuments-201
60114-story.html.
9. Id.
10. Homepage, SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW BALTIMORE’S PUBLIC CONFEDER-
ATE MONUMENTS, http://baltimoreplanning.wix.com/monumentcommis
sion (last visited March 11, 2016).
11. Conservation of Baltimore City’s Monuments, Memorials & Sculpture by
the Commission for Historical & Architectural Preservation Commission,
CITY OF BALTIMORE, http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/Government/Boards
andCommissions/HistoricalArchitecturalPreservation/MonumentsandCon
servation/MonumentProgramExhibit.aspx (last visited March 11, 2016).
12. Id.
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cle.13 The two statutory distinctions refer to different bodies gov-
erning Maryland historical preservation. The finance article governs
the Maryland Historical Trust and, in pertinent part, the Trust’s
board, which examines, prepares, and suggests historical monuments
on a national scale.14
Maryland statute allows the creation of a commission to review sub-
jects of historical designation.15 Any such commission is required to
contain at least five members with a majority residing in the jurisdic-
tion in which the commission is created.16 Although a catch-all provi-
sion in the statute allows the appointing jurisdiction to appoint
members within specific areas of expertise, commission member re-
quirements as a whole are directed towards informed historical monu-
ment preservation.17 Maryland jurisdictions, such as Baltimore City,
have the power to elect commissions to determine and designate local
historical monuments.18 To serve this purpose, every jurisdiction has
the authority to elect commissions subject to statutory requirements.19
In 1964, Article Six of the Baltimore City Municipal Code established
the Commission for Historical and Architectural Preservation
(“CHAP”) through the Department of Planning.20 CHAP’s members
are appointed by the mayor and work in the City’s Department of
Planning.21
On December 8, 2015, CHAP adopted new rules and regulations
for historic preservation and historic preservation guidelines pursuant
to the City code requirements.22 CHAP’s adopted mission statement is
to “enhance and promote the culture and economy of Baltimore
through the preservation of buildings, structures, sites, and neighbor-
hoods that have aesthetic, historic, and architectural value” in ways
including, but not limited to, conserving monuments, providing pres-
ervation-oriented recommendations to the local government, and co-
ordinating with other City agencies.23 CHAP’s rules embody the
13. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See infra notes 14-15 and accompa-
nying text.
14. MD. CODE. ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5A-311 (2016).
15. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8-201 (2016).
16. § 8-202.
17. § 8-202(b)(2).
18. § 8-104.
19. § 8-201, 202.
20. Baltimore City Historic Preservation Rules and Regulations, CITY OF BALTIMORE, 1
(Dec. 8, 2015) [hereinafter CHAP Rules and Regulations] http://chap.balti
morecity.gov/sites/default/files/CHAP%20RULES%20AND%20REGULA
TIONS%2012%209%2015.pdf.
21. Id.
22. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., REV. ORDINANCE 15-408, art. 6, § 2-11 (2015); CHAP
Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 1; Baltimore City Historic Preservation
Design Guidelines, CITY OF BALTIMORE (Dec. 8, 2015), http://archive.balti
morecity.gov/Portals/0/agencies/chap/public%20downloads/NEW%20
CHAP%20DESIGN%20GUIDELINES%20-%2012%208%2015.pdf.
23. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 1.
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statutory policy of preservation by enacting additional procedural safe-
guards, such as hearings, to further protect historical material.
B. Constitutionally Protected Property Interests
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.”24  Due process requirements are equally applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as through due
process provisions in state constitutions.25 The creation of an individ-
ual property interest protected by procedural due process begins with
affirmative and independent state action.26 The U.S. Supreme Court
has been hesitant to explicitly define the state action required to cre-
ate a property interest, but has established a required threshold a
valid property interest must meet.27 Property interests sufficient to in-
voke the Due Process Clause require “more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation. He
must, instead, have legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”28
C. The Present Renewed Interest in Maryland’s Confederate Monuments
On June 18, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Walker v. Texas
Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. that license plates were govern-
ment speech, therefore holding the state’s denial of an application for
license plates printed with the Confederate flag as constitutional.29
The decision was public and controversial, highlighted by an increase
in racism-fueled violence. On the same day the U.S. Supreme Court
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; M.D. CONST. art. 24 (“That no man ought to
be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land.”).
26. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the
Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence
of a property interest is determined by reference to ‘existing rules or un-
derstandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’”)
(quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
27. But see Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
“[T]he range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infi-
nite.” Id.
28. Id. at 577.
29. Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2256 (2015) (5-4 decision) (Alito, J., dissenting). “Suppose that the State
posted some government messages on these billboards and then, to raise
money, allowed private entities and individuals to purchase the right to
post their own messages. And suppose that the State allowed only those
messages that it liked or found not too controversial. Would that be consti-
tutional?” Id. at 2256 (comparing the majority’s analysis of Confederate li-
cense plates).
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announced its decision, a shooting occurred in Charleston, South
Carolina.30 Dylann Storm Roof, a twenty-one-year-old white man,
killed nine African Americans during a Bible study.31 After he was ap-
prehended his anti-black views were made public, specifically the use
and promotion of the Confederate flag.32
Following the shooting and South Carolina citizens’ demands that
the Confederate flag be removed from flying at the state capitol,
Mayor Rawlings-Blake announced the creation of a Special Commis-
sion to examine all of the City’s Confederate historical monuments.
Of the seven individuals appointed to the Special Commission, four
are members of CHAP.33 The four monuments examined are “the
Confederate Soldiers and Sailors Monument on Mount Royal Avenue,
the Confederate Women’s Monument on West University Parkway,
the Roger B. Taney Monument on Mount Vernon Place, and the Rob-
ert E. Lee and Thomas. J. “Stonewall” Jackson Monument in the Wy-
man Park Dell.”34
D. The Historical Relevance of the Monuments
i. Historical background of the monuments not recommended for
removal
The Confederate Soldiers and Sailors Monument, also known as the
Spirit of the Confederacy Monument, was erected in 1903 to com-
memorate the Civil War.35 The statute depicts an angel supporting a
wounded Confederate soldier and bears the inscription “Gloria Victis”
or, “Glory to the Vanquished.”36 In 1918, the Civil War was commemo-
rated again in the erection of the Confederate Women Monument.37
The monument portrays two women, one of whom is caring for a
solider, and is inscribed with “In difficulty and danger, regardless of
self, they fed the hungry, clothed the needy, nursed the wounded and
comforted the dying.”38 The monuments are not representative of in-
30. Nick Corasaniti, et al., Charleston Massacre Suspect Held as City Grieves, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/us/charles
ton-church-shooting.html.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 3.
34. Id.
35. Maryland Military Monument Inventory, MD. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Jan.
2014), https://veterans.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/
03/Jan-2014-MMM-Inventory.pdf (indexing monuments from the Gover-
nor’s Commission on Maryland Military Monuments).
36. Spirit of the Confederacy Monument in Bolton Hill, MONUMENT CITY, http://
monumentcity.net/2009/04/01/confederate-soldiers-sailors-monument-
baltimore-md/ (last visited March 11, 2016).
37. MD. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 35.
38. Confederate Women of Maryland Monument, MONUMENT CITY, http://monu
mentcity.net/2009/04/01/confederate-soldiers-sailors-monument-baltimor
e-md/ (last visited March 11, 2016).
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dividuals, but rather of how the Civil War affected women and young
soldiers. Based on the Special Commission’s recommendation, the
glorification of a group is more socially acceptable than of specific
individuals.39 Accordingly, the Special Commission voted six to one to
keep the two monuments, but to “add context” to address the racial
implications of the Civil War.40
ii. Historical significance of the monuments recommended for
removal
The Roger B. Taney Monument on Mount Vernon Place is an 1887
recast of the original 1871 monument in front of the Anne Arundel
County State House.41 The re-casted monument depicts the U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice in his judicial robes holding a copy of the United
States Constitution.42 Born in Calvert County, Maryland, Justice Taney
sat on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1836-1864.43 Despite his near
thirty-year term, Justice Taney is most remembered for authoring the
majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.44
The “Lee-Jackson” Monument is the most recent monument com-
memorating the Civil War, with its erection in 1948, and depicts two
of the War’s famous generals.45 The monument is inscribed with quo-
tations from both generals.46 General Lee is quoted with the phrase,
“Straight as the needle to the pole Jackson advanced to the execution
of my purpose,” while General Jackson’s inscription reads, “So great is
39. Broadwater, supra note 8.
40. Id.
41. Roger B. Taney, (sculpture), SMITHSONIAN ART INVENTORIES CATALOG,
http://siris-artinventories.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?uri=full=3100001~!11336
~!0#focus (last visited March 11, 2016); Roger B. Taney, MD. STATE ART
COLLECTION, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc1500/sc1545/apc_
website/apcsculpture_taney.html (last visited March 11, 2016).
42. Taney, (sculpture), supra note 41.
43. Taney, MD. STATE ART COLLECTION, supra note 41.
44. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (rejecting a slave’s argument
that his domicile in a free state under the Missouri Compromise established
citizenship that would permit him to sue his owner for freedom), superseded
by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868); but see id. at 425. “For if the father of
young Darnall had manumitted him in his lifetime, and sent him to reside in a
State which recognized him as a citizen, he might have visited and sojourned in
Maryland when he pleased, and as long as he pleased, as a citizen of the
United States; and the State officers and tribunals would be compelled, by the para-
mount authority of the Constitution, to receive him and treat him as one of its citi-
zens, exempt from the laws and police of the State in relation to a person of
that description, and allow him to enjoy all the rights and privileges of citi-
zenship, without respect to the laws of Maryland, although such laws were
deemed by it absolutely essential to its own safety.” Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
45. MD. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 35.
46. Lee-Jackson Monument, (sculpture), SMITHSONIAN ART INVENTORIES CATALOG,
http://siris-artinventories.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=14T736937B7
C9.7247&profile=ariall&uri=link=3100009~!1171503~!3100001~!3100002&
aspect=Browse&menu=search&ri=2&source=~!siartinventories&term=Lee-
Jackson+Monument%2C&index=ALTIT (last visited March 11, 2016).
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my confidence in General Lee that I am willing to follow him blind-
folded.”47 The bottom of the statue bears the artist’s signature and an
inscription that states, “They were great generals and Christian
soldiers and waged war like gentlemen.”48 In addition to depicting
figures central to the Civil War, the monument was the first double
equestrian monument in both the United States and Europe when
erected in 1948.49
III. Issue
A. Whether Historic Monuments Provide Benefits Sufficient to Create a Valid
and Constitutionally Protected Property Interest for Baltimore and its
Citizens
The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously held that legitimate
property interests have existed where an individual was “receiv-
ing. . .benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining
eligibility for [those benefits]. . . has an interest in continued receipt of
those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process.”50 The govern-
ment benefits from historical preservation are codified in Maryland’s
land use article as “the preservation and appreciation of those sites, struc-
tures, and districts for the education and welfare of the residents of each
local jurisdiction.”51 Maryland statute extends these benefits with
other eligibility requirements that proposed monuments must meet in
order to gain the protection benefit associated with historic
preservation.52
B. Whether Removal of Historic Monuments and Its Benefits Violates a Valid
and Constitutionally Protected Property Interest for Baltimore and Its
Citizens
Baltimore City has enacted CHAP’s rules and regulations which
contain criteria to become a member of CHAP.53 Baltimore City, pur-
suant to and in accordance with the land use article of the Maryland
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. CINDY KELLY, Lee and Jackson Monument, 1948, in OUTDOOR SCULPTURE IN
BALTIMORE: A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO PUBLIC ART IN THE MONUMENTAL CITY
198, 198-199 (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press ed., 2011), available at http://
media.wix.com/ugd/ce643a_3fc2ea66caf5488bac679f5142e88552.pdf.
50. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (holding
that a person entitled to welfare benefits by meeting statutorily imposed
requirements had a continued property interest in receiving them); see
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 604 (1960).
51. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8-104(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
52. § 8-102 (requiring a purported monument to be a “site, structure, or dis-
trict of historic, archaeological, or architectural significance” for historical
preservation).
53. See infra Part IV.C.ii and accompanying analysis.
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code, has enacted implicit statutory criteria to determine eligibility for
the benefits of historic preservation.54 The citizens not only meet
CHAP’s member criteria, but also meet the statutory requirements of
local residents with a direct interest in local economy, tradition, edu-
cation, culture, and welfare, rendering them eligible to receive the
benefits associated with historic preservation.55 The citizens, as indi-
viduals and a whole, meet incorporated requirements to participate in
CHAP, gaining those educational and cultural benefits associated with
a public dialogue on historical preservation.56 This comment will ad-
dress whether the City and the Special Commission’s removal of the
monuments implicates and denies the citizens property interest in
continuing to receive those benefits.57
C. The Disparity Between the City’s Actions, Policy in Support of Historic
Preservation, and the Special Commission’s Recommendation to Remove
Historical Confederate Monuments
Baltimore City has repeatedly acknowledged and reaffirmed the
benefits associated with monument preservation.58 This comment will
address Baltimore’s explicit recognition of the citizens’ benefits by not
only their place in CHAP’s newly adopted regulations, but also in the
City and State code.59 The Due Process Clause provides that no per-
sons may be denied their life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.60 This comment will also address how Baltimore City’s affirma-
tive action in maintaining these benefits impacts the application of
due process when removal of the monuments constitutes city action
removing existing government benefits.61
Both CHAP and the Special Commission are governed by the land
use article of the Maryland code on historic preservation.62 Clear legis-
lative intent mandates commission operation under a policy of preser-
vation, not of removal.63 Although the Special Commission’s
recommendation is subject to the mayor’s final decision, the Special
Commission’s recommendation to remove the monuments is in direct
contrast with codified public policy as well as CHAP’s recently enacted
mission statement.64 This comment will address that, even in the ab-
54. See infra Part IV.C.iii and accompanying analysis.
55. See infra Part IV.C.iv and accompanying analysis.
56. Id.
57. See infra Part IV(D-E) and accompanying analysis.
58. See generally infra Part IV.C and accompanying analysis (examining the ways
in which Baltimore City has recognized the benefits of historic preservation
through statutory law and substantive municipal law).
59. See infra Part IV.B.i-ii and accompanying analysis.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. See infra Part IV.D-E and accompanying analysis.
62. See generally Md. Code Ann., Land Use §§ 8-101 – 8-501 (2016) (governing
historic preservation in Maryland).
63. § 8-102 (2016).
64. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20 at 1.
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sence of a constitutional violation, there is a glaring disparity between
Maryland’s unwavering policy in support of historical preservation
and the Special Commission’s recommendation to the mayor.65
IV. Analysis
A. The Municipality of Baltimore City and Its Citizens Both Have the Stand-
ing Required to be Parties to a Civil Claim of Unconstitutional Govern-
ment Action
In order to successfully assert a claim of unconstitutional action, not
only must Baltimore citizens have standing to bring a claim, but also
assert that Baltimore City is amenable to be sued. Valid citizen stand-
ing exists pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code, provid-
ing any person deprived of constitutional rights through state action
with the remedy of a civil claim.66 Following codification, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has struggled to determine whether the provided rem-
edy allows a claim to be brought against a state or municipal
government.67 The U.S. Supreme Court conducted extensive inquir-
ies into legislative intent and the statute’s overall history.68 Following
the Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of
New York, a local government entity has no qualified immunity “when
implementation of its official policies or established customs inflicts
the constitutional injury” and may be subject to suit as a result.69 Balti-
more City’s charter explicitly defines itself as a corporate entity with
the capacity to sue and be sued.70 Prior to the merits of the Baltimore
citizens’ claim of unconstitutional action, both parties are qualified
and amenable to be sued.
B. Baltimore City Has Repeatedly Acknowledged the Social, Educational,
and Cultural Benefits Stemming from Monument Preservation
The preservation of history serves multiple purposes.71 In memori-
alizing significant aspects and figures from the past, the present devel-
65. See infra Part IV.D-E and accompanying analysis.
66. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016).
67. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that “Congress did not
undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of [§ 1983]),
overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 665 (1987) (stating that a “fresh analysis of the debate on the Civil
Rights Act of 1871” required overruling previous decisions). See also City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
68. Monell, 437 U.S. at 665-668 (focusing on the historical debates of H.R. 320’s
Sherman amendment prior to codification).
69. Id. at 708; but see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710 (1973)
(holding that a municipal government is not vicariously liable for govern-
ment-employed police officer).
70. Charter of Baltimore City, ch. 351, art. I § 1 (2014); see infra note 81.
71. Introduction to MANAGING HISTORIC SITES AND BUILDINGS: RECONCILING PRES-
ENTATION AND PRESERVATION, 2 (Gill Chitty & David Baker, eds. 1999).
140 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 5
ops context and insight for those depicted. Arguably, one of the most
important reasons for historic preservation is in favor of future insight
and development. By preserving both the good and bad parts of his-
tory, the present society is not only informed of historical achieve-
ments, but also aware of mistakes once made and to be avoided in the
future.72 The ethical benefits to cities and citizens alike confirm the
need for the protection of landmarks and other historical markers,
specifically monuments.73 Confederate monuments, as standing re-
minders of all implications of the Civil War, provide the benefits of
historical education, social understanding, and cultural inheritance.74
i. The existing government benefits from historic preservation are
recognized by the City’s continuous efforts in conservation and
protection
In the last fifty years, Baltimore City, both by its own actions
through the mayor and CHAP, has undertaken multiple campaigns
and fundraising efforts to promote historical preservation and protec-
tion.75 Following its founding in 1964, CHAP worked with various Bal-
timore City Mayors for the specific purpose of preserving and
protecting historical monuments.76 CHAP’s 1977 inventory of Balti-
more City’s monuments and historic buildings found 123 monuments
within the municipal borders.77 Between 1980 and 1986, Baltimore
City and CHAP jointly funded and executed “The Baltimore Bronze
Project” in efforts to preserve and rehabilitate the City’s forty-five
bronze historical monuments.78 CHAP’s authority merged with the
Baltimore City Department of Planning in 2004 to specifically dedi-
cate more funds to historic monument preservation.79
72. Id. at 2 (stating “Preservation of what has been inherited from the past is a
matter for ethical framework.”).
73. Id.
74. Id. (stating “These [monuments] can be sources of confusion, and, at the
same time, valuable in a holistic view of the historic environment.  What is
now becoming understood as a truly ‘sustainable’ approach seeks to retain
a full range of options for choice in the future, and not to diminish long
term historic assets for the short-term purpose of making them instantly
and easily intelligible.”).
75. See generally Kathleen G, Kotabara, A Report on the Conservation of Baltimore
City Monuments, Memorials, & Sculpture, COMM’N FOR HISTORICAL & ARCHI-
TECTURAL PRES. (CHAP) (December 2013) [hereinafter “Monument Re-
port”], available at http://www.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/
CHAPs%20Monument%20Program%20Publication%202013%20Update.
pdf (reporting all CHAP activity in monument preservation).
76. Id at 2.
77. Id. (stating that “CHAP was given this responsibility because of its mission,
expertise, and ordinance requirements. (Article 6 of the Baltimore City
Code.)”).
78. Monument Report at 3.
79. Id.
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CHAP’s recent efforts reiterate not only the City’s understanding of
the importance of preservation, but also the understanding of its citi-
zens. In 2007, Baltimore citizens volunteered in conjunction with the
City to establish “a new City-wide Adopt-A-Monument Program, in-
tended to supplement the City’s investment in monument conserva-
tion.”80 The citizens most recently used their Adopt-A-Monument
program for the “Lady Baltimore” project, funding both the removal
and preservation of the original sculpture and the creation of a rep-
lica sculpture on the Baltimore Battle Monument.81 The continued
actions of Baltimore City and its citizens to preserve historic monu-
ments indicate mutual recognition of the historical, educational, and
cultural benefits resulting from their conservation.
ii. The benefits of historic preservation are codified in the Maryland
code, the Baltimore City code, and CHAP’s rules and regulations
State action regarding the preservation of historical monuments is
given significant statutory weight in its codified public purpose: “to
preserve sites, structures, and districts of historical, archaeological, or
architectural significance and their appurtenances and environmental
settings.”82 The land use article of the Maryland code provides the
option to elect commissions to further achieve that purpose.83 In addi-
tion to membership and appointment requirements, the code specifi-
cally defines the purpose and powers of all commissions.84 The public
purpose of a commission is “to preserve sites, structures, and districts of
historical. . . significance.”85 An identical provision is enacted in the
subtitle of the Baltimore City code governing CHAP.86
On December 8, 2015, the Baltimore City Department of Planning
approved CHAP’s proposed rules and regulations.87 In addition to in-
ternal rules and procedures for committee action, CHAP established
“Criteria for Evaluation” to evaluate potential subjects of historic pres-
ervation.88 In determining historical significance, CHAP considers
what, if any, benefit the monument provides in its preservation:
The quality of significance in Baltimore history, architec-
ture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in dis-
tricts, sites, buildings, public interiors, structures, and objects
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. at 7.
82. MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8-102 (2016).
83. See generally § 8-2 (allowing the creation of historic preservation commis-
sions and defining their purpose and authority).
84. §§ 8-101, 102, 201, 202, 205, 302, 303, 305.
85. § 8-102 (emphasis added).
86. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE § 2-9 (2015).
87. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 8; See generally BALTIMORE CITY,
MD., CODE § 2 (2015) (governing CHAP’s creation, authority, purpose, and
procedures.).
88. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 8.
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that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling, and association, and:
1. That are associated with events that have made a significant
contribution to the broad patterns of Baltimore history; or
2. That are associated with the lives of persons significant in
Baltimore’s past; or
3. That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period,
or method of construction, or that represent the work of a
master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent
a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may
lack individual distinction; or
4. That have yielded or may be likely to yield information impor-
tant in Baltimore prehistory or history.89
Based on standards set by the National Park Service for the National
Register of Historical Places, CHAP initially adopted these considera-
tions in their 2012 publication of Baltimore’s historic landmarks.90
CHAP differentiates the designation of historic landmarks and dis-
tricts from monuments.91 However, CHAP identically incorporated
these factors into their new rules and regulations that specifically ad-
dress the historic preservation of public art and monuments. By doing
so, CHAP reinforces the need for monuments to provide beneficial
memories of significant contributions, persons, periods, or informa-
tion within Baltimore’s history.92
iii. The Taney and Lee-Jackson monuments provide the citizens of
Baltimore with City-recognized benefits that would cease if the
monuments were removed
The City’s rationale justifying monument preservation specifically
indicates the purpose and benefit of historical context. CHAP’s stan-
dards consider historical value on the basis of the depiction of a signif-
icant event, person, period, or information.93 The use of the word
“or” indicates that in order to qualify, a monument is permissively
worth historical value even if it only satisfies one of the considera-
tions.94 Absent from any published standard or regulation is a provi-
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. National Register of Historic Places, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/
nr/publications/bulletins/nrb15/nrb15_2.htm (last visited March 11,
2016); Baltimore City’s Designated Landmark List, Commission For Historical
and Architectural Preservation, 1 (July 2012) [hereinafter “CHAP Land-
mark List”] http://chap.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/Baltimore
%20City%20Landmarks%20publication.pdf.
91. See generally CHAP Landmark List at 1 (detailing the City’s parallel effort in
preserving historically designated districts and landmarks).
92. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 8.
93. See generally id. (requiring a monument to depict a significant event, person,
period, or information in Baltimore history).
94. Id.
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sion demanding that historical value be contingent on its acceptability
in the present social landscape.95
Justice Taney was a significant person to Baltimore both as a Mary-
land citizen elected to the U.S. Supreme Court and in his authorship
of the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.96 While that decision has since
been overturned, Justice Taney and his depiction now represent “how
history has changed, interpreted, and has progressed throughout the
centuries” as well as “the historical perspective of the 19th century.”97
Justice Taney’s monument meets CHAP’s historical considerations for
preservation in its depiction of not only a significant person, but also
of a significant event in Baltimore history.98 Confederate Generals Lee
and Jackson were responsible for the majority of wartime decisions in
the Confederacy, in which Maryland was included.99 In addition to
depicting persons significant to Maryland’s role in the Civil War, the
monument was the sole double equestrian monument in both the
United States and Europe when installed in 1948, fulfilling CHAP’s
mission through the preservation of highly distinct and masterful ar-
tistic values.100
Historic preservation of these monuments has provided Baltimore
City and its citizens with the benefits of historic education, tradition,
information, and social context.101 The citizens of Baltimore have a
valid property interest in the continued receipt of these benefits.102 In
recommending and instituting a process to remove the monuments,
the Special Commission will deny the citizens of the benefits associ-
ated with historical preservation.103 Established property interests are
afforded constitutional protection.104 If government action implicates
a property interest, the infringement is valid only when it is done in
accordance with procedural due process of law.105
95. Id. The standards clearly indicate the importance of preserving monuments
that either provide or have the potential to provide information about Bal-
timore. Absent racial implications, the Civil War and its depictions are in-
formative of Baltimore’s role in history. Should race become a
consideration, the monuments arguably now and will provide information
to prevent Baltimore from committing atrocities comparable to those of
the Civil War. Id.
96. Taney, MD. STATE ART COLLECTION, supra notes 41.
97. Id.
98. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 8.
99. KELLY, supra note 49.
100. See supra Part IV.B.i-ii and accompanying analysis.
101. Id.
102. See infra Part IV.C and accompanying analysis.
103. See infra Part IV.D-E and accompanying analysis.
104. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring no denial of life, liberty, or
property without Due Process of law).
105. Id.
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C. Baltimore City Created the Baltimore Citizens’ Constitutionally Protected
Property Interest when it Created Standards of Eligibility for the Citizens to
Receive the Benefits Associated with Historic Preservation
i. An individual property interest in the continued receipt of bene-
fits subject to due process is created when an individual is eligible
for the benefit based on state-created criteria
An individual’s property interest requires property, a benefit stem-
ming from the property, and the individual’s “legitimate claim of enti-
tlement” to receive the benefits.106 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted
that property exists in many different forms, including in the form of
an existing receipt of government benefits.107 While the designation
of property does not require positive or negative economic value,
CHAP’s preservation of the City’s monuments creates benefits of
honor, protection, expert review, and economic tax incentives accord-
ing to CHAP’s 2012 Designated Landmark List. The recognized bene-
fits that stem from the preservation of Baltimore City’s monuments
therefore satisfy the threshold requirement of “property” in determin-
ing whether a property interest has been created.108
In order to foster a legitimate claim of entitlement, an individual
must show what elements of state law support eligibility to receive a
benefit that is reasonably expected based on “rules or understanding
[from state law] that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits.”109  Once an individual’s interest is es-
tablished, there is an inherent constitutional protection of a property
interest in the continued receipt of the benefit.110
106. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
107. Id. at 576 (“Thus, the Court has held that a person receiving welfare bene-
fits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for
them has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safe-
guarded by procedural due process.”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1963).
108. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 169 (stating “we [the Court] have never held that a
physical item is not “property” simply because it lacks a positive economic
or market value.”); CHAP Landmark List, supra note 90 at 1, 2; see also
CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 8 (indicating the importance
of “significance of Baltimore history” is shown by preservation of
monuments).
109. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578 (comparing a valid property interest resulting from
eligibility of statutory terms to receive welfare with a valid property interest
specifically defined in an employment contract).
110. Id. at 576.
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ii. Baltimore City, through CHAP and the Special Commission, cre-
ated benefit eligibility criteria in CHAP’s rules and regulations on
membership
CHAP’s rules and regulations govern procedural elements includ-
ing, but not limited to, the committee’s role, meetings, and member-
ship requirements.111 The mayor of Baltimore appoints thirteen
citizens to serve as committee members, each eligible for two four-year
terms.112 CHAP members also have the discretionary power to ap-
point committees “for special purposes or study.”113 This power, in
conjunction with the mayor’s power of member appointment, allowed
the creation of the seven-member Special Commission, four of whom
are current CHAP members.114 Based on the criteria established in
the rules and regulations, any citizen of Baltimore meets CHAP’s
membership requirements and is eligible for a committee position.
The eligibility to be elected to CHAP vests Baltimore citizens with di-
rect access to the benefits of historical preservation. Because all citi-
zens are eligible, a valid basis exists to claim an interest in the benefits
stemming from CHAP’s historical preservation.
iii. The Baltimore City code, governed by Maryland statute, created
benefit eligibility criteria in historic preservation statutes
Title Eight of Maryland’s Land Use statutes govern historic preser-
vation.115 Maryland general provisions outline the purpose of state his-
toric preservation as well as the importance for local governments to
achieve such preservation.116 The statute allows local jurisdictions to
enact legislation or other legal safeguards for the purpose of historic
preservation.117 In defining the purpose of these safeguards, the Mary-
land statute recognizes the benefits of historic preservation as well as
implicitly creating criteria to receive those benefits.118 The statutory
criteria require that eligible recipients be reflective of local heritage,
subject to the local property and economy, and residents of the local
111. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20 at 2-3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Rawlings-Blake, supra notes 3, 33.
115. See generally MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8 (2016) (governing state and local
historic preservation efforts).
116. See generally MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8-104 (2016) (defining the powers
of a legislative body and the purpose of local law).
117. § 8-104(a) (2016) (stating “The legislative body of each local jurisdiction,
by local law, may regulate: the construction, reconstruction, alteration,
moving, and demolition of sites or structures of historical, archaeological,
or architectural significance; the construction, reconstruction, alteration,
moving, and demolition of sites and structures within districts; and the ap-
purtenances and environmental settings of sites and structures within the
limits of the local jurisdiction.”); See generally § 8-104(b) (defining the pur-
pose of local law in historic preservation).
118. § 8-104.
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jurisdiction.119 As a result of eligibility, recipients receive the codified
benefits.120
Pursuant to Maryland’s statutory historic preservation title, the Bal-
timore City code adopted and incorporated similar regulations.121 Ar-
ticle Six of the code governs local historic and architectural
preservation and contains provisions comparable, if not identical, to
the Maryland code.122 In explicitly detailing the purpose of historic
preservation, the Baltimore City code similarly and implicitly adopts
criteria for receiving the benefits of preservation.123 The criteria re-
quire that preservation benefits go directly to local residents with an
implicit interest in their local education, culture, economy, and gen-
eral welfare.124
iv. Baltimore citizens have a legitimate property interest in the mon-
uments that are subject to procedural due process
The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously maintained that the
threshold showing for a property interest is a legitimate individual
claim of entitlement. In Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
creditors succeeded on a legitimate claim of entitlement to benefits of
a property interest from funds deposited into a statutorily formed
bank account.125 The Court found a legitimate claim of entitlement
existed because the creditors, eligible to deposit and receive interest
from the account, were therefore afforded an interest in continuing
to receive the benefit of interest.126
119. § 8-104(b)(1); § 8-104(b)(2-3); § 8-104(b)(5).
120. § 8-104(b) (recognizing that historic preservation “safeguard[s] the heri-
tage of the local jurisdiction. . .stabilize[s] and improves property values. . .
foster[s] civic beauty. . . strengthen[s] local economy; and promote[s] the
preservation and appreciation [of history] . . . for the education and wel-
fare of the residents of each local jurisdiction.”).
121. See generally BALTIMORE CITY, MD., REV. ORDINANCE 15-408, art. 6 (2015)
(governing historic and architectural preservation in Baltimore City).
122. Compare id. (requiring that recipients of benefits of historic preservation are
local with an implicit interest in education, culture, and welfare), with MD.
CODE ANN., LAND USE § 8-104(a) (2016) (requiring that recipients be re-
flective of local heritage, subject to local property and economy, and re-
sidents of the local jurisdiction).
123. REV. ORDINANCE, art. 6 § 1-4(a).
124. Id. The similarity between the two statutory provisions and the resulting
criteria indicates that because the Maryland Code governs the Baltimore
City Code, the City adopts and incorporates State policy. Id.
125. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
126. Id. The creditors had “more than a unilateral expectation” to funds depos-
ited into a statutorily-created account. “It was property held only for the
ultimate benefit of Webb’s creditors. . . [and] only for the purpose of mak-
ing a fair distribution among those creditors. Eventually, and inevitably,
that fund, less proper charges authorized by the court, would be distributed
among the creditors as their claims were recognized by the court. The cred-
itors thus had a state-created property right to their respective portions of the
fund.” Id. (emphasis added).
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The citizens of Baltimore City meet every element of government-
established criteria to receive the benefits stemming directly from his-
torical preservation. Any citizen of Baltimore City is eligible to become
a member of CHAP, meeting criteria in CHAP’s rules and regulations
as an individual or as a collective group.127 Additionally, Baltimore
citizens meet every element of implicit state and municipal criteria to
be eligible for historic preservation benefits.128 The citizens are local
residents with a direct interest in their local economy and education.
As a result, the citizens are subject to all local historical context, tradi-
tion, and welfare.129 Because the citizens have met substantive criteria,
their interest in the associated historical, educational, and social bene-
fits rises above an abstract need or unilateral expectation.130 A legiti-
mate claim of entitlement is supported by the citizens’ eligibility at the
state, municipal, and municipal agency level.131 City residents have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefits stemming directly from
the preservation of Baltimore’s Confederate monuments.132
D. Baltimore City and the Special Commission’s Meetings to Determine the
Removal of the Taney and Lee-Jackson Monuments Violate the Procedural
Due Process Rights Afforded to a Constitutionally Protected Property
Interest
i. Procedural due process requires a prior notice and an opportunity
for a pre-deprivation hearing
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of property in-
terests allows individuals to rely on a sense of security.133 Because the
citizens have met state-determined requirements, due process affords
127. See supra Part IV.B.i and accompanying analysis.
128. See supra Part IV.B.ii and accompanying analysis.
129. See REV. ORDINANCE 15-408, art. 6.
130. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying analysis.
131. See supra Part IV.
132. CHAP Landmark List, supra note 90, at 2; WILLIAM THOMAS ALDERSON &
SHIRLEY PAYNE LOW, Interpretation of Historic Sites, 26 (2nd ed. 1996)
(“Clearly, nostalgia is one o the prime motivations [to visit historical monu-
ments.] Other visitors appear to be searching for their cultural roots and
for a sense of belonging.  They want to experience the sense of continuity
that the site can help provide as a tangible link with the past.”); contra Mon-
umental Task Comm., Inc v. Foxx, No. CV 15-6905, 2016 WL 311822, at *16
(E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2016) (“Moreover, rather than establish that any of the Plain-
tiffs acquired an interest to the. . .monuments. . .Plaintiffs merely argue that
certain exhibits ‘call into question who owns the monument[s]’ and the
land on which they sit. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a
recognized property interest in the monuments within the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as required for a likelihood of success on the mer-
its.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
133. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of property is a safeguard
of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific
benefits.”).
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reliance on the continued receipt of government benefits.134 In deter-
mining whether procedural due process has been afforded, the right
of the individual is weighed against “whether the government has suf-
ficient justification for taking away a person’s. . .property.”135 In
weighing those interests, procedural due process generally requires a
hearing when government denial implicates a significant property in-
terest.136 If Baltimore City’s historically designated monuments are re-
moved, not only will Baltimore City residents be denied the benefits of
their property interest, but also be unconstitutionally denied the pro-
tections of procedural due process.
ii. Baltimore City, through CHAP and the Special Commission, vio-
lated procedural due process when it failed to hold sufficient
hearings
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a hearing is required when
removal of a government benefit would deny the recipient of an es-
sential or fundamental necessity.137 In the context of welfare benefits,
a recipient was entitled to a hearing because his reliance on the in-
come was a foundation of his daily life.138 The monuments do not
provide the citizens of Baltimore any monetary benefit. However, the
equitable and unique benefits of the monuments are foundational to
the daily lives, existence, culture, and education of every citizen.139
These benefits are so essential that they have been recognized in Ma-
ryland statute, Baltimore City code, and through the creation of
CHAP.140 Having demonstrated the degree to which the monuments
and their benefits are essential, the citizens of Baltimore are entitled
to procedural due process of law.
Determining a potential violation of due process requires that the
interests of the government be weighed against the interests of the
citizen(s).141 The amount of procedure sufficient to satisfy due pro-
cess is directly related to the amount of injury, loss, or equitable de-
134. Id. at 576. “It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect
those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined.” Id. (emphasis added); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 (1970) (stating “Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitle-
ment for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state
action that adjudicates important rights.  The constitutional challenge can-
not be answered by an argument that. . .benefits are a ‘a “privilege” and not
a “right.”’”) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
135. Monumental Task Committee, Inc. et al. v. Anthony R. Foxx et. al., No. 15
Civ. 6905, 2016 WL 311822, at *12, (U.S.D.C. 2016).
136. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
137. Id. at 266.
138. Id.
139. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying analysis.
140. Id.
141. Monumental Task Committee, Inc. et al. v. Anthony R. Foxx et. al., No. 15
Civ. 6905, 2016 WL 311822, at *12, (U.S.D.C. 2016).
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nial to the individual.142 Baltimore City’s Confederate monuments
provide benefits so fundamental that they are protected by the State
and City regulations.143 While the monetary support of welfare is lim-
ited, the monuments provide citizens with a fundamental understand-
ing of history, culture, and education that is fundamental to their
autonomy.144 The citizens of Baltimore, having demonstrated a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement to those benefits, are therefore due substan-
tial legal process in the form of a hearing before Baltimore City may
remove the monuments and terminate their associated benefits.145
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
broadly outlined the ways in which a plaintiff may prevail on a proce-
dural due process claim against a municipality.146
Under circuit precedent, a § 1983 plaintiff can prevail on a
procedural due process claim by demonstrating that the
property deprivation resulted from either: (1) an established
state procedure that itself violates due process rights, or (2) a
“random and unauthorized act” causing a loss for which
available state remedies would not adequately compensate
the plaintiff. . .. If. . .the City’s action was the result of an
established state procedure, then the question would be
whether that procedure violated due process rights.147
Following the sixth circuit’s approach, the citizens of Baltimore have a
claim arising under the first factor. Founded on the lack of opportu-
nity for public testimony and the inadequacy of the meetings to qual-
ify as hearings, the citizens of Baltimore will succeed on a claim for
the violation of their procedural due process rights.148
Mayor Rawlings-Blake announced the Special Commission’s crea-
tion and purpose of the Confederate monument review on June 30,
2015.149 On September 4, 2015, the names and occupations of the
Commission members were released.150 The announcement also in-
142. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 (“The extent to which procedural due process
must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which. . . [the
person] may be “condemned to suffer grievous loss” and depends upon
whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the govern-
mental interest in summary adjudication.”) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Ref-
ugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, (1951)) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
143. See supra Part IV.B and accompanying analysis.
144. Supra note 132 and accompanying text.
145. Warren v. City of Athens, Ohio, 411 F.3d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Gener-
ally, the process that is due before a property deprivation includes prior
notice and an opportunity for a predeprivation [sic] hearing.”) (referenc-
ing Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994)).
146. Id. at 709.
147. Id. at 709-10.
148. See infra notes 149-167 and accompanying text.
149. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 3.
150. Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, Mayor Rawlings-Blake Announces Appointment of
Members to Special Commission to Review Baltimore’s Confederate Statutes, CITY OF
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cluded the date, time, and location of Special Commission meetings.
They were to be held Thursday, September 17 at 9:00 a.m., Thursday,
October 29 at 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, December 15 at 5:00 p.m., and
Thursday, January 14, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. at the City Department of
Planning.151 These times were published on the mayor’s official city
blog and a separate CHAP-created website about the Special Commis-
sion.152 Of the four meetings, only the December 15 meeting wel-
comed public testimony.153
Public testimony revealed equally strong citizen opinions for and
against the monuments’ removal during the December 15 meeting.154
However, regardless of preference, the broad range of individual in-
terests expressed was significantly outweighed by the time and actions
of the Special Commission.155 The Special Commission heard testi-
mony for less than three hours in the only meeting allowing public
testimony.156 Those three hours occurred in one meeting out of four,
and in the context of a six month investigatory and reviewing
process.157
The Special Commission’s limitation of public opportunity was ex-
plicit in their agenda and presentations from the remaining three
meetings, none of which invited public testimony.158 The presentation
from the first meeting on September 17, 2015 outlined the Special
Commission’s purpose, goals, and methods of achievement. The pres-
entation addressed the subsequent meetings, noting that the public
may attend all but only testify at one of them.159 The presentation
proposed methods to collect testimony such as by mail, voicemail, a
suggestion box, an online form, or allocating time at meetings.160 Of
BALTIMORE (Sep. 4, 2015) http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-re-
leases/2015-09-04-mayor-rawlings-blake-announces-appointment-members-
special-commission.
151. Id.
152. Id.; See generally SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW BALTIMORE’S PUBLIC CON-
FEDERATE MONUMENTS, supra note 10 (detailing the Special Commission’s
actions).
153. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 150.
154. See Previous Meetings and Reference Materials, SPECIAL COMMISSION TO RE-
VIEW BALTIMORE’S PUBLIC CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS, http://baltimore
planning.wix.com/monumentcommission#!schedule/cro0 (last visited
March 11, 2016).
155. Id.
156. SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW BALTIMORE’S PUBLIC CONFEDERATE MONU-
MENTS, supra note 154.
157. See SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW BALTIMORE’S PUBLIC CONFEDERATE MON-
UMENTS, supra note 10.
158. PowerPoint Presentation on composition, outline, and outcomes of the
Mayor’s special initiative, SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW BALTIMORE’S PUB-
LIC CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS 1 (Sep. 17, 2015) [hereinafter “Commission
PowerPoint”], available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/ce643a_0e63fcb6288
f47fdb188b237726000c5.pdf.
159. Id. at 13-14, 16-17.
160. Id. at 17.
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these, the Special Commission selected two.161 However, the same
presentation states under the heading of “Public Testimony” that
“Staff recommends that public testimony be collected via a limited
number of, but clearly defined. . .methods.”162 In directly expressing
the desire to limit public testimony, the Special Commission infringed
on the procedural due process afforded to the citizens.163
In applying the prescribed balancing test, Baltimore City’s actions,
through the Special Commission, must be weighed against the nature
of the citizens’ property interest being denied and the procedure that
led to the denial.164 The opportunity for citizen testimony to be heard
was minimal and grossly outweighed by the time spent in meetings
without public input.165 Three hours in the context of a six month
investigation does not rise to an adequate hearing, let alone a “mean-
ingful” one.166 Regardless of other methods selected to allow citizens
an opportunity to be heard, the Special Commission explicitly noted
the limitation of public testimony as one of the Commission’s goals.167
Baltimore City’s stance that the monuments’ removal benefits the
public is the opposite of a legally defined public benefit and indicative
of how little opportunity the public has had to be heard.168 Ultimately,
the totality of the circumstances shows that neither the Special Com-
mission’s actions nor meetings rose to the level of a pre-deprivation
hearing required by due process.169
161. Id.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. at 17.
164. Monumental Task Committee, Inc. et al. v. Anthony R. Foxx et. al., No. 15
Civ. 6905, 2016 WL 311822, at *12, (U.S.D.C. 2016).
165. See supra notes 154, 158.
166. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (hold-
ing that “the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the dep-
rivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are impli-
cated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”); see Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 62 (1965) (holding that the “Due Process Clause
requires the hearing to be ‘meaningful.’”).
167. See supra note 158, at 16.
168. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 694 (Ch. 1832) (stat-
ing that public benefit does not require direct or immediate participation,
but is determined in individual context of time and community.; see also R.
E. H., Annotation, Public Benefit of Convenience as Distinguished from Use by the
Public as Ground for the Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain, 54 A.L.R. 7,
n.12 (1928).
169. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971). “It is a proposition which
hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes considera-
tion of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature
here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.” Id. Nasier-
owski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 896 (6th Cir.
1991) (“Governmental determinations of a general nature that affect all
equally do not give rise to a due process right to be heard. But, when a
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E. In the alternative, Baltimore City and the Special Commission’s Non-Com-
pliance with the Maryland Open Meetings Act Violates the Procedural Due
Process Rights Afforded to a Constitutionally Protected Property Interest
i. The Maryland Open Meetings Act establishes procedure affording
protections equivalent to procedural due process
Maryland recently enacted the Open Meetings Act, (“the Act”), ef-
fective October 1, 2014.170 The policy of the Act highlights the impor-
tance of the public’s role and observation of government action.171
The Act also recognizes the essential nature of the effectiveness of
public involvement by stating that “[t]he conduct of public business in
open meetings increases the faith of the public in government and
enhances the effectiveness of the public in fulfilling its role in a democratic
society.”172 While emphasizing the need for a continuous conversation
between the public and the government, the Act proposes policy mir-
roring the protections of procedural due process.173 The similarities
in rationale are further legitimized by the Act’s requirement of public
notice and an open session for the public, a direct comparison to the
constitutional rights of notice and opportunity to be heard.174
ii. Baltimore City, CHAP, and the Special Commission are governed
by the Maryland Open Meetings Act
The Act applies to “a public body meeting to consider. . . a special
exception, variance, conditional use, or zoning classification, the en-
forcement of any zoning law or regulation, or any other zoning mat-
ter.”175 CHAP and the Special Commission are contained in the City’s
Department of Planning, rendering a zoning matter such as monu-
ment removal subject to the Act. The Special Commission is sitting as
a public body, therefore subjecting it to the control of the Act.
The Act specifically lists criteria necessary to be a public body sub-
ject to the Act.176 A public body must be more than two people, and
relatively small number of persons are affected on individual grounds, the
right to a hearing is triggered.”).
170. See generally MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROV., § 3 (2016) (codifying the Open
Meetings Act).
171. See generally § 3-102 (codifying the Act’s legislative policy).
172. § 3-102(b)(2) (emphasis added).
173. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (requiring that a hearing
between the public and the government be meaningful).
174. GEN. PROV. §§ 3-301, 3-302.
175. § 3-103.
176. See generally MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROV. § 3-101(h)(1-2) (2016). “ ‘Public
body’” includes any multimember board, commission, or committee ap-
pointed by the Governor or the chief executive authority of a political sub-
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the body must be “created by. . . a county or municipal charter,. . . an
ordinance, a rule. . . or an order of the chief executive authority of a
political subdivision of a state.”177 Sitting as seven individuals repre-
sentative of the municipality of Baltimore City, the Special Commis-
sion is a public body governed by the Act. Further support for the
Act’s jurisdiction over the Special Commission is CHAP’s incorpora-
tion by reference of the Act in their recently adopted rules and regula-
tions.178 The Special Commission, consisting of four CHAP members
and created through CHAP, is legally required to hold proceedings in
compliance with the Act.
iii. Baltimore City and the Special Commission violated Baltimore
citizens’ procedural due process rights when they violated the
Maryland Open Meetings Act
The Act requires not only that public body general conduct be held
openly, but also that the public have sufficient access to the delibera-
tions, rationale, and assertion of their role in a democratic society.179
In support of the citizens’ role in public decisions, the Act states, “it is
the public policy of the State that the public be provided with adequate
notice of the time and location of meetings of public bodies, which
shall be held in places reasonably accessible to individuals who would like
to attend these meetings.”180 The mayor announced the dates and
times of the Special Commission’s meetings in a September press re-
lease, at least two weeks prior to the Commission’s first meeting.181
Although the citizens were provided with adequate notice of the
times, the times of the meetings themselves are reflective of the Com-
mission’s explicit intent to limit public inclusion and access.
The Special Commission meeting in December 2015, which invited
public testimony, complied with the Act’s requirements and policy of
public involvement in municipal decisions.182 However, this one meet-
ing is also the only instance in which the Special Commission arguably
complied with the Act. All other Special Commission meetings, while
open to public attendance, were scheduled on weekdays during work
hours, generally around 9 a.m.183 While facially neutral, the practical
implication of these meeting times prevents any citizen working full-
177. MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROV. § 3-101(h)(1)(i-ii)(3, 5, 6, 8) (2016) (emphasis
added); see generally Charter of Baltimore City, ch. 351, art. I § 1 (2014)
(establishing Baltimore City as a municipality); supra note 81.
178. CHAP Rules and Regulations, supra note 20, at 3.
179. GEN. PROV. § 3-102.
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181. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 150.
182. See id.; SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW BALTIMORE’S PUBLIC CONFEDERATE
MONUMENTS, supra note 10; MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROV. § 3-102 (2016).
183. Rawlings-Blake, supra note 150.
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time from attending the meetings without skipping work.184 The Spe-
cial Commission could have argued compliance with the Act if the
non-testimonial meetings were at other times, giving citizens barred
from one meeting time the opportunity to attend another.185 Unfortu-
nately, absent that or other efforts accounting for the working citizen,
the Special Commission violated the Act.
The Act functions and embodies the same policies as the procedu-
ral safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause.186 Both require the
government to act with consideration of the fundamental role of citi-
zens in federal, state, and local government.187 Accordingly, both pro-
tect the citizen’s right to assert a claim against the government.188
Comparison of the overarching policy with the Special Commission’s
actions, statements, and procedural operation yields a glaring inequal-
ity with the protections afforded and the consideration given.189 The
Special Commission violated the Act in the inaccessible nature of the
meetings and in the disparity between the amount of opportunity
given to the citizens when compared with the time spent in review.190
The Special Commission has unquestionably satisfied the notice re-
quirement when a public body considers a citizen interest. However,
the limited access to meetings considered in conjunction with the
minimal amount of citizen opinion ultimately solicited denied the
public an opportunity to be heard.191 By violating the Act, the Special
Commission denied the citizens of Baltimore an opportunity to voice
a legitimate claim to their property interests in the monuments.192 If
the Confederate monuments and their recognized benefits are re-
moved, Baltimore City, through the Special Commission, will have de-
nied every citizen of Baltimore of their constitutionally protected
rights.
V. Conclusion
As of March 11, 2016, the Special Commission has not released
their formal written report.193  Pursuant to the report and its publica-
tion, Mayor Rawlings-Blake will make the final decision on the fate of
184. Id. (showing the three meeting periods scheduled during normal full-time
work hours).
185. Id.
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Baltimore’s Confederate monuments.194 This decision, however,
should be made in consideration of the monuments’ value both as
property and as what they represent.195 Historical monuments provide
the benefits of historical context, education, tradition, and informa-
tion.196 Regardless of the embodied context or message, historical
monuments provide an undeniable benefit:
Many people have a romantic view of a past that they believe was
less hurried and more relaxed than the time in which they live.  They
now minimize or ignore the hardships of the past—hardships that, by
the way, are seldom interpreted at the sites.  Instead, visitors contrast the
best of the past with some of the worst of our own jet-paced, plastic,
and computerized age.  For many visitors, then, the historic site is a
form of escape.197 The historical capacity of a monument provides
benefits—statutorily recognized benefits–to Baltimore citizens regard-
less of race, ideology, or culture.
Since the monuments’ installation, citizens of Baltimore have re-
ceived these benefits and integrated them into not only an under-
standing of belonging, but into their everyday autonomy and
awareness.198 The constitutional right to procedural due process pro-
tects the continued receipt of fundamental benefits, especially when
they are inherent in an individual’s life.199 These inherent benefits
rise above a unilateral desire or abstract need, supporting a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a property interest.200 Presently, the Special
Commission has not shown Baltimore citizens the consideration that
due process not only affords, but guarantees.201 Absent increased pub-
lic involvement or other Special Commission’s actions to rectify the
present, they have denied the citizens of Baltimore the procedural
due process of law afforded at the local, state, and federal levels.202
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